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Black-Scholes Neutral Repricing is a compensation repricing practice in which the 
executives exchange their executive options with a high exercise price for a smaller 
number of options with a lower exercise price when the stock price experience a 
severe decline. The exchange is structured so that the total Black-Scholes value of the 
option is the same immediately before and after the exchange. This paper studied the 
change of the incentive benefits before and after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing, 
within a Certainty Equivalent valuation framework, and found that the Black-Scholes 
neutral repricing is a pareto optimal practice given the executive's utility and outside 
wealth are known. The incentive effect of the compensation options to increase the 
company stock price will increase after repricing, independent of the parameters 
specified in the valuation, and without any additional cost incurred to the 
shareholders. Both the executive and the shareholders will be better off. The 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Equity-based (stocks and options) compensation has emerged as the single largest 
component of compensation for US executives. The objective of almost company 
stock option plans is to help the company attract, retain and motivate its executives 
and other employees. The intuition behind it is to mitigate the agency problem by 
aligning the interest of executives with that of the shareholders. 
However, equity-based compensation and the level of managerial equity incentives 
are the aspects of corporate governance that are especially controversial. In the prior 
executive compensation studies, there are alternative views on the efficiency of 
observed contracting arrangements between the shareholders of the company and 
their executives'. For the options to achieve the objective of aligning the interest of 
executives with that of the shareholders, it is essential that they are non-tradable and 
the executives are restricted from taking actions to short sell or hedge the company 
securities. The restrictions imposed on executives induced a divergence between the 
cost and the value of executive stock options. Particularly, the cost of the executive 
stock options is measured as they are tradable and hedgable from the shareholders' 
‘Core et al. (2002) summarized the previous studies of options compensation and managerial 
incentives. 
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point of view, so the Black-Scholes valuation model applied. While from the point of 
view of the risk-averse and undiversified executives, who can neither sell the option 
nor hedge its risk, the value to them will below the cost to shareholders. This 
difference must be weighed against the incentive benefits in determining the optimal 
level of stock options compensation. 
As the stock markets have begun to pull back from their historically high levels, the 
boards of directors of companies that have used stock options to attract and retain 
employees have found themselves under increasing pressure to modify or replace 
previously issued stock options that have gone underwater, i.e. options whose 
exercise price is above the current market price of the corporation's stock. To address 
this problem, corporate boards are confronted with the prospect of repricing these 
existing options in order to allow them to retain their incentive value. 
Option repricing is a controversial issue in stock option compensation literature. 
Company often describe repricing as a useful tool for restoring incentives and 
retaining executive talent after a period of stock decline and most stock options plans 
currently in existence permit repricing. However, outside shareholders voiced intense 
opposition to this practice on the ground that it apparently rewards the executives for 
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poor performance. Hold the cost of the stock options constant, such as the practice of 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing which is exchanging fewer lower strike price option 
for higher strike price option, the repricing could reduce the gap between the value 
and the cost of the options to the executive and company respectively. The repricing 
should make the schedule more efficient to convey the compensation. 
This paper studied the change of the incentive effects before and after the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing, which holds the total compensation cost constant. 
Compared with Hall and Murphy (2002), who found that executive incentives after 
the Black-Scholes neutral repricing could either increase or decrease, depending on 
the specific parameters involved, I found that the incentive would increase for 
different parameters used in the valuation, under the assumptions and conditions 
within the Certainty Equivalent valuation framework. The incentives of the 
executives would be re-aligned with those of the shareholders by the Black-Scholes 
neutral repricing, without any additional cost incurred to the shareholders, which is a 
pareto optimal practice. 
This paper proceeds as following, in the next chapter I discuss several issues 
concerned the executive options repricing. Chapter 3 reviews the literature of the 
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valuation of the executive options and the practice of options repricing. Chapter 4 
specifies the methodology of this paper and Chapter 5 shows the numerical results 
for the base case. Chapter 6 tests the sensitivity of the numerical results to different 
parameters involved. Chapter 7 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 Executive options repricing 
Stock option repricing is generally accomplished through one of two approaches, 
either through a cancellation of an existing option followed by a re-grant at a lower 
exercise price; or by simply amending an outstanding underwater option to reduce its 
exercise price. Regardless of the approach that is contemplated, there are numerous 
and very significant legal, tax and accounting issues that must be addressed by the 
board of directors who is considering repricing. This chapter highlights the more 
significant issues raised by option repricing. 
2.1 Plan Restrictions 
The terms of the option plan must be reviewed to determine whether there are any 
provisions which could affect stock option repricing. In most circumstances, an 
option plan will not address repricing at all. In such a case, if repricing is to occur, it 
will usually involve a cancellation of a previously existing option and an issue of a 
new option with all the same terms and conditions of the cancelled option, other than 
the lower exercise price - in other words a re-issue. Before undertaking a re-issue, the 
plan terms should be reviewed to confirm that the shares represented by the cancelled 
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options will be added back to the number of shares authorized and reserved for 
issuance under the plan. In the absence of such a provision, the plan administrator 
could risk granting options for more shares than are authorized, with the result that 
certain shares issued upon exercise of options would not be validly issued. Also, if 
the re-issue approach is to be taken, the board of directors must confirm that the 
stated term of the plan has not expired and that it is otherwise possible to make 
option grants under the plan. 
In many recently drafted plans, explicit provision is made for repricing and the 
re-issue approach will not be necessary. Usually, however, if a plan permits repricing, 
it will be explicitly conditioned on shareholder approval. In such a case, repricing 
will not be possible by simple amendment to the exercise price of an outstanding 
option, but instead the board of directors will have to take the repricing proposal to 
the shareholders. Also, if a plan specifically contemplates repricing, other conditions 
may be imposed, including limits on the extent to which the exercise price may be 
reduced as well as other restrictions, such as vesting periods or specific restrictions 
on the underlying stock. 
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2.2 Corporate Governance Issues 
Shareholders are usually opposed to the repricing of stock options. As a result of this 
opposition, repricing presents a risk of, and has lead to, shareholder lawsuits. Such 
challenges will typically allege corporate waste or lack of appropriate shareholder 
approval. A charge of waste of corporate assets is based on the grounds that the 
corporation arguably has received no benefit from the repricing. Generally, the board 
of directors will enjoy a presumption that they acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in an honest belief that the action in question was taken in the best interest 
of the corporation; and if the presumption applies, a court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the directors. If, however, an arrangement is found to have 
resulted in a waste of corporate assets, the directors would not be shielded by this 
presumption and may be held liable to shareholders. Other claims which are 
sometimes raised with respect to repricings include allegations that the repricing was 
not permitted under the plan document, the repricing violated the corporation's 
articles of incorporation and/or bylaws, and the directors, who are often also 
employees or officers of the corporation, were "interested" in the action and, 
therefore, breached their duty of loyalty to the corporation. 
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In the face of this potential legal opposition, a board of directors that is confronted 
with a repricing decision must carefully consider whether the repricing is necessary 
or desirable in light of the corporation's short and long term interests, as well as the 
interests of its employees and its shareholders. Repricing of underwater stock options 
is often justified by the argument that underwater stock options have little or no 
incentive or retention value for employees. 
A board of directors can, to some degree, shield themselves from legal liability by 
presenting a repricing plan for approval by corporate shareholders. Since 
shareholders are likely to be concerned that repricing is merely a short-term solution 
to a problem, and that it is inconsistent with the best interests of the corporation, 
certain conditions are often included in a repricing plan in an attempt to instill 
long-term focus. These conditions often include a requirement that the repricing be 
undertaken only in exchange for the optionee's consent to a reduction in the number 
of shares subject to the option, and, perhaps, selective repricing directed only at 
middle management and lower level executive employees. Finally, any repricing plan 
should be constructed so as not to create an entitlement mentality among employees 
whereby employees may have expectations of similar repricing programs being 
implemented in the future. When considering corporate governance and shareholder 
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issues, a board of directors must remain aware that option repricing will often be 
viewed by non-employee shareholders as inconsistent with the notion that employee 
stock ownership aligns the interest of employees with that of the shareholders. By 
protecting optionees from losses in their options, the interests of the optionees may 
no longer be aligned with that of the shareholders who suffer real losses as the stock 
declines in value. 
2.3 Securities Law Issues 
For public corporations, the SEC proxy rules provide that if stock options held by 
certain named executive officers (generally the five highest paid executives) are 
repriced, the corporation must disclose the option repricing of all executive officers 
for the preceding ten-year period, and must include an explanation by the board of 
directors, or the compensation committee of the board, of the repricing including the 
basis of each such repricing. Also, if any named executive officer has an option 
repriced, the board of directors or the compensation committee of the board, must 
discuss its policies with respect to the option repricing in the proxy statement 
narrative. Any repricing will trigger the obligation to footnote and describe the option 
repricing on the corporation's financial statement. 
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In some cases, this proxy disclosure obligation has lead corporations to exclude 
named executive officers from repricing. In fact, this may tend to be viewed in a 
more favorable light by shareholders than an "across the board" repricing because the 
named executive officers are not rewarded when the shareholder value declines, but 
lower level employees are not unnecessarily penalized for the actions of 
management. 
The securities laws will generally treat a repriced stock option as a cancellation and 
re-issue. Under Chapter 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934，which 
addresses short-swing profit liability, if a new grant is deemed to have occurred, the 
short-swing profit rules may require a six-month holding period from the date of the 
repricing of the option. 
2.4 Accounting Issues 
2.4.1 Accounting for stock options 
Prior to 1995, accounting for stock options was governed by Accounting Principles 
Board Opinion No.25 (APB 25), which did not require the recognition of 
compensation expense. In 1995 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
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issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (SFAS 123) to govern 
the accounting for stock options. SFAS 123 encourages, but does not require, 
companies to recognize the expenses of compensation options on the income 
statement. Because most companies have opted not to recognize compensation 
expense, most financial statements accounting for stock options under APB 25, but 
fulfill SFAS 123 requirements in the footnote disclosures. 
2.4.2 Stock Option Compensation Accounting 
When accounting for stock options plans, the key accounting issue is how to 
calculate the compensation expense. 
2.4.2.1 Calculation of Compensation Expense Under APB 25 
Under APB 25, stock compensation expense is equal to excess of the market price of 
the stock over its exercise price on the measurement date. This is referred to as the 
intrinsic value method. This method is not based on external factors, such as stock 
volatility or expected length of option life. Once the compensation expense has been 
calculated, it is expensed equally over the service period of the stock options. The 
service period, unless otherwise specified, is the time between the grant date and the 
vesting date. 
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2.4.2.2 Calculation of Compensation Expense Under SFAS123 
Under SFAS 123, the fair value of the stock options issued is calculated using an 
option pricing model to determine the compensation expense on the grant date. This 
method, the fair value method, values the stock options based on external factors. 
Like APB 25, the compensation expense is allocated equally over the service period. 
2.4.2.3 Difference Between APB 25 and SFAS 123 
The key difference between accounting for stock options under APB 25 and SFAS 
123 is the calculation of the compensation expense. APB 25 requires the intrinsic 
value method, while SFAS 123 advocated the fair value method to determine 
expense. 
2.4.2.4 Stock Compensation Plan Disclosures under SFAS 123 
FASB issued SFAS 123^ to govern the accounting for stock options. The Standard 
encourages but does not require companies to recognize the expense of compensation 
options on the income statement or on pro forma disclosures. Most companies have 
2 Financial Accounting Standards Board, "Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123: 
Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation," October 1995，http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl23.pdf. 
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opted for the latter form of reporting. Because of the recent turmoil in capital markets, 
this issue is being reconsidered and required reporting on the income statement may 
result from the current debate. Nevertheless, the following rules are currently in 
place. 
2.4.2.5 Pro Forma Disclosures 
SFAS 123 provides for the following required disclosures: 
i. Effect on income and earnings per share (EPS). 
ii. Detailed data with respect to the number of options outstanding and their 
related characteristics (expiration, exercise prices, whether they are 
currently exercisable). 
iii. The fair value of the options issued during the year, valued at the grant 
date, and whether or not these options are in-the-money, 
out-of-the-money, or at-the-money. 
iv. A description of the method used to value the options, including the 
risk-free interest rate, the option's maturity, the stock's volatility, and 
any expected dividends. 
V. Any compensation cost recognized during the period. 
vi. Data related to option repricing during the period. 
vii. Data related to other compensation using equity instruments, such as 
restricted stock or phantom stock. 
2.4.3 Summary 
The above accounting concerns would account for the reason why most of the 
executive stock options are set to be at the money when granting. And in the recently 
issued Interpretation No. 44, interpreting APB Opinion No. 25, "Accounting for 
Stock Issued to Employees", the Financial Accounting Standards Board has provided 
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guidance concerning the accounting effects of repricing options. Under this 
interpretation, if a corporation reprices its options, the primary adverse result is that 
variable plan expense accounting will be attributed to the repriced option from the 
date of repricing until the exercise date. This will require that the corporation 
recognize an ongoing earnings expense charge in connection with the appreciation in 
value of the stock underlying the repriced option. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
5.1 Options Repricing 
An executive options repricing occurs when the issuing firm resets the strike price of 
an employee stock options. Options repricing occurs most frequently following a 
significant decline in the underlying stock price. Typically, the strike price is reset to 
the new stock price. 
Executive stock options present a nettlesome valuation problem. This problem arises 
because FASB Standard 123 encourages, but does not require, using the fair value 
method of accounting for employee stock options. Under the fair value method, the 
cost of an executive stock options is recorded as the price that the option would bring 
in a market transaction between willing parties. Because executive stock options are 
not traded, however, market prices are unobservable. For reporting purposes, FASB 
123 allows estimates of market prices to be obtained from the Black-Scholes option 
pricing model or from an equivalent binomial option pricing model. 
Many accounting and finance professional and researchers doubt that the 
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Black-Scholes model or an equivalent binomial model can estimate the fair value of 
an executive stock options. Citing such issues as the reduction in executive stock 
options from inalienability (non-tradability), Huddart (1994), Kulatilaka and Marcus 
(1994)，and Rubinstein (1995) argued that executive stock options could be worth 
even less than estimates from the minimum value method (Smith and Zimmerman 
1976), which calculates executive stock options value as the difference between the 
current stock price (adjusted for future dividends) and the present value of the 
exercise price. 
Inalienability reduces executive stock options value in the following scenario. 
Although executive stock options can not be bought or sold, they can be exercised 
anytime after vesting. An employee holding executive stock options will exercise 
them when the certain utility from exercise exceeds the expected utility from 
deferring exercise. As the employee's risk aversion grows, immediate exercise 
becomes more attractive. If the executive stock options could be traded, the 
employee would sell it rather than exercise it. Instead, the executive stock options 
holder must exercise the option, thereby reducing its value. Because a version of the 
Black-Scholes model that allows American style exercise assumes a traded option 
and a value-maximizing exercise strategy, executive stock options value may be 
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overstated. 
A repricing feature can significantly affect executive stock options value and limit 
the generality of this conclusion. A repricing provision allows the exercise price of an 
executive stock options to be reset downwards following a stock price decline. 
Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (1999) and Chance, Kumar, and Todd (1999) 
suggest that the incremental value of a repricing feature can be substantial. 
Although potentially valuable, executive stock options repricings are infrequent 
events. For example, Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (1999) find that 1.3% of the 
firms in his sample change option award terms in any given year. However, the 
incidence of repricing varies considerably across industry classification. Carter and 
Lynch (2001)，Ittner et al. (2001) find that repricing frequency is substantially higher 
for small, hi-tech "new economy" firms. 
In any case, repricing occur with a frequency sufficient to draw alarm from the 
popular press and attract significant academic interest. Fueling this interest is the 
observation that the likelihood of an executive stock options repricing increases 
substantially following a period of poor stock price performance. For example, 
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Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (1999) report that the most significant predictor of 
a repricing event is a decline in the firm's stock price. Saly (1994) documents an 
increase in repricing activity following the 1987 market crash and Gilson and 
Vetsuypens (1993) find that almost one-third of a sample of financially distressed 
firms repriced their outstanding executive stock options following a significant stock 
price decline. 
3.2 The Valuation of Executive Stock Options 
The current accounting treatment of executive stock options, and the debate 
surrounding it, is the result of SFAS 123 "Accounting for Stock-Based 
Compensation", which was issued in 1995. The new standard encourages, but does 
not require, recognition of compensation costs based on the "fair value method", i.e., 
the market value of options awarded as of the grant date. The FASB noted that a fair 
value can be estimated using available option pricing models, including the 
Black-Scholes (1973) and Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (1979) approaches, once these 
models are adjusted to reflect certain aspects of executive stock options that differ 
from traded options. 
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Before SFAS 123，accounting for compensation arising from executive stock options 
grants was generally based on the "intrinsic value method" in which an expense is 
recognized at a grant date only to the extent that the executive stock options is 
"in-the-money", meaning that the stock price exceeds the exercise price of the option, 
however, most executive stock options are granted "at-the-money", whereby the 
exercise price equals the stock price at the grant date. Because the intrinsic value is 
zero in this case, no compensation expense is recorded. 
3.3 Extant executive stock options Valuation Models 
Beginning with Smith and Zimmerman (1976)，a growing body of literature proposes 
and investigates valuation models for executive stock options. The primary 
difference among existing models reflect the various economic conditions that are 
included. Some models focus on the fact that executive stock options are actually 
warrants issues by the firm and include the effects of equity dilution (Noreen and 
Wolfson 1981; Galai 1989). Other models, citing evidence that equity dilution is 
relatively small, ignore it and focus instead on the fact that employees who depart the 
firm must lose or exercise their options (Foster, Koogler, and Vickrey 1991,1993; 
Jennergren and Naslund 1993; Cuny and Jorion 1995). Still other authors focus on 
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specific difference between executive stock options and traded stock options, such as 
taxes, inalienability, delayed vesting, and longer maturity (Huddart 1994; Kulatilaka 
and Marcus 1994; Rubinstein 1995). 
Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994)，Huddart (1994)，and Rubinstein (1995) develop 
models that move well beyond a naive application of the arbitrage based valuation 
models of traded stock options. Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994) incorporate the rate of 
return on the stock into their model and show that a risk premium on the stock can 
significantly affect executive stock options value. They also show that as risk 
aversion rises, the value of the option falls because it leads to premature exercise by 
the executive stock options holder. Kulatilaka and Marcus further note that, under 
certain conditions, increasing the variance of the underlying stock can decrease the 
value of an executive stock options by hastening the exercise decision. 
Huddart (1994) finds that, in addition to the employee's risk preferences, the vesting 
schedule set by the employer can affect executive stock options value. By restricting 
the possibility of premature exercise, a lengthy vesting period raises the cost of an 
executive stock options to the employer. 
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Rubinstein (1995) develops a model that accounts for various difference between 
executive stock options and traded call options using a varied set of inputs. Using a 
binomial tree valuation approach, Rubinstein documents the effect of several 
differences between executive stock options and traded stock options on the value of 
executive stock options and reports that, through careful selection of input 
parameters, firms can overvalue or undervalue their executive stock options. 
Early exercise of exchange traded call options on a non-dividend paying stock is 
never optimal, since investors can receive more by selling the option (Merton 1973). 
However, as pointed out by Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994)，Huddart (1994)，and 
Rubinstein (1995), early exercise of an executive stock options can be rational under 
certain likely conditions. Because executive stock options cannot be sold, a 
riks-averse employee wishing to reduce portfolio risk might exercise an executive 
stock options prematurely, even though this action might significantly reduce the 
value of the executive stock options. That is, an employee might wish to exercise an 
executive stock options early, even when early exercise is not optimal for a 
comparable traded stock option. As a result of this "sub-optimal" exercise policy, 
Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994), Huddart (1994)，and Rubinstein (1995) find that the 
cost to an employer who issues an executive stock options can be significantly less 
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than what traditional arbitrage based option pricing models suggest. 
Lambert, Larker, and Verrecchia (1991) emphasize the role of non-option wealth in 
diluting the effects of employee risk aversion. Ignoring non-option wealth can lead to 
a misleading assessment of a utility-maximizing exercise strategy, because executive 
stock options typically constitute only a fraction of an employee's total wealth. 
Employees may also have substantial investments in real estate, financial assets, and 
human capital. In particular, employees often have significant wealth invested in the 
underlying stock shares. 
Finally, the valuation methods employed be Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (1999) 
account for a single repricing using formulas drawn from barrier option theory. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
This paper examine the option repricing issue with the certainty equivalent valuation 
approach based on the LLV model, allowing the executives to invest his wealth and 
cash compensation in the risk free asset, which is similar with Hall and Murphy 
(2002)，to maximize his/her expected terminal utility. Consistent with LLV and Hall 
and Murphy, I use the same assumptions about the form of the executive's utility 
function and the distribution of future stock prices. I assume that the executive has 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) p, so the utility function is 
‘In(炉） p = 1 
" ( 矛 ) 二 丄 萨 ( 1 ) 
[ l - P 
And the stock prices in T years is assumed to be lognormal with volatility o and 
expected value (rf+P(rm-rf)- aV2)T, where p is the company's systematic risk and im 
is the return on the market portfolio^. 
A typical compensation package is assumed to be comprised of salary a, s shares of 
stock of the company and n stock options to purchase n shares of stock at strike price 
3 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is assumed. No dividend paid assumed for simplicity. 
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A： in T years. The outside wealth of the manager is Wq. 
So at time T, the wealth of the manager is: 
炉r = (flf + fTo )(! + />)''+ sSt + nC{Sj，K) (2) 
where C ( S T ， K ) is the payoff value of the call option, S T is the company stock 
price4. 
Under the certainty equivalent approach by LLV, which estimated the value of a 
non-tradable option to an undiversified risk-averse executive as the amount of 
riskless cash compensation the executive would exchange for that option granted. Let 
this certainty equivalent value of the option to be V. So the wealth of the manager at 
time T will be: 
W,' =ia + W,+V){\ + r^Y+sS, (3) 
With the assumptions about the utility function and the distribution of the stock 
prices, we could solve the following optimization problem numerically to get the 
certainty equivalent value V for the n stock options. 
'U{W； ) f i S , )dS, = \UiW, ) f i S , )dS, (4) 
J 
4 The dilution effect of the exercise of executive options is ignored as the number of options is 
assumed to be significantly less than the number of outstanding shares. 
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And traditionally, the incentive benefit of the options compensation is measured by 
the partial derivative of the option value with respect to the underlying stock price, 
the delta of the option. As argued above, the value of the option is not the same as 
the cost to the company, so the Black-Scholes value is inappropriate for the 
calculation of the incentive benefit. Another numerical analysis will be applied, to 
get the certainty equivalent value changed in response to the change of underlying 
stock price. 
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Chapter 5 Numerical Results 
5.1 Parameters Specification — Base Case 
I assume that the executives have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) equals 1, 
which means the logarithm utility U(Wt)=Ln(Wt) applied here. I adopted the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and assume that the distribution of stock prices in T 
years is lognormally distributed with volatility cr and expected value equals to 
Vj. + - r j . ) - ^ / ^ y 5 where rf is the risk free rate, Fm-rf is the market risk 
premium, p is the firm's systematic risk.� In the following numerical calculation, 
assume no dividend, a-=0.3 (the median volatility for S&P 500 firms), P = \ (the 
market average beta), rf=6%, and market risk premium is 6.5%. The sensitivity of the 
qualitative results in this paper to reasonable changes in these parameters will be 
tested later. 
Assume that the executive was offered a compensation package comprised of 5000 
shares of the company stocks, 5,000 shares of options to purchase 5,000 shares of the 
company stocks in the future and $100,000 cash. The stock price at the options 
5 For tractability, I assume that the distribution of future stock prices is the same whether the 
executive receive options or cash. 
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granted time is $100, so the strike price of the options was set as $100, i.e. the 
options were at-the-money on the grant date. 
5.2 Value Line 
Consider, at the time when the options have 10 years to mature. The following 
Figure. 1 showed the Black-Scholes (BS) Value and Certainty Equivalent (CE) Value 
with respect to the possible values that the stock prices could achieve. The outside 
wealth of the executive is assumed to be $5,000,000 at this time. 
The dashed curve in Figure. 1 showed how the Black Scholes Values of the Options 
holding by executives varies with changes in stock price ranging from $0 to $200. 
While the solid curve is a plot of the per share Certainty Equivalent Value^ of the 
non-tradable options to the risk-averse and undiversified executives, as a function of 
stock price. 
From the diagram shown in Figure. 1，I find that the Certainty Equivalent Value Line 
showed a similar shape of the Black Scholes Value Line, in spite of the fact the 
6 These values are solved with numerical methods, the algorithm and programs are shown in the appendix. 
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Certainty Equivalent Value Line is strictly below the Black Scholes Value Line. 
Certainty Equivalent Value showed a large discount of the Black Scholes Value of the 
Executive Options, which means the value of the options to the executive is much 
less than the cost of the options occurred to the company. It is consistent with the 
founding of LLV (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002). 
The Table. 1 showed part of the values constructed the figure. 1 As indicated by 
Table. 1, when the Executive Options are at the money (Stock Price is $100), The 
Certainty Equivalent Value is only $12.76 per share compared with the Black 
Scholes Value of $55.69, which is the value of the option if it is tradable and the 
holder is well diversified. Certainty Equivalent Value is 22.9% of Black-Scholes 
value, the discount is determined by the level of the risk aversion and outside wealth 
of the executive. More risk averse executive will consider less valuable of the 
non-tradable options. And more wealth the executive has accumulated, the less value 
she will put on the non-tradable options, this issue will be illustrated in the later part. 
5.3 Incentive Effect 
The incentive effect of the executive options compensation is measured as the partial 
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derivative of the Certainty Equivalent Value with respect to the underlying stock 
price. With numerical differentiation methods, Figure.2 showed how the incentive 
effect of the option compensation varies with the changes in the underlying stock 
price, where the strike price is $100. 
Incentive is interpreted as the change in the dollar amount value of the compensation 
options to the executive given one-dollar change in the underlying stock price. 
Illustrated in the above graph, the incentive effect is nearly zero when the options are 
deeply out of the money, then increases as the stock price rises, and eventually 
converge to an incentive ceiling, which is $0,633 in this case. In contrast to 
traditional method of measuring the incentive as the delta of Black Scholes Valuation, 
which is the partial derivative of the change in Black Scholes Value with respect to 
the underlying stock price, or approximately A (^di) in the Black Scholes Formula. As 
shown in the above Figure.2, the Black Scholes delta converges to one when the 
options is deeply in the money, and the whole Black Scholes Incentive curve lies 
strictly above the Certainty Equivalent Incentive Curve. It means that the traditional 
incentive benefits measurement is systematically overestimate the real incentive by 
ignoring the non-tradability of the compensation options and the risk aversion and 
undiversfication of the executives. When measuring the intention and the results of 
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an option repricing, the Certainty Equivalent Incentive should be used as the 
measurement instrument. 
5.4 Black-Scholes Neutral Repricing 
Black-Scholes Neutral Repricing is a compensation repricing practice in which the 
executives exchange their options with a high exercise price for a smaller number of 
options with a lower exercise price. The exchange is structured so that the total 
Black-Scholes value of the option is the same immediately before and after the 
exchange. From the executive's perspective, the exchange is beneficial since both 
options have the same expected value but the lower-priced options are less risky (i.e., 
have a higher probability of ultimately being exercised). From the shareholders' 
perspective, the cost is the same with or without the exchange. The following section 
whether the incentive effects of the compensation options will increase or decrease, 
based on the previous Certainty Equivalent valuation and incentive effects 
measurement. 
Suppose in a Black-Scholes neutral repricing, the newly issued executive option 
differs from that cancelled previously issued option only in the strike price, the 
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re-issued option is set to at the money as setting the strike price of it to be equal to 
the declined stock price. Other terms of the options, such as time to exercise, vesting 
period, are unchanged after the repricing practice. And the characteristics of the 
distribution of the underlying stock future value are assumed to be same before and 
after the repricing event, which means the expected return and volatility of the 
underlying stock are assumed to be the same after repricing. 
Let BS(S,K) denote the Black-Scholes Value of the options, where S and K are 
underlying stock price and strike price of the option respectively/ Assume that 
repricing only occurred in the circumstance that the current stock price So declines to 
the level less than the strike price K, i.e., So<K, the strike price is reset to the current 
stock price S。，so the Black-Scholes Value of the repriced option is BS(S�,So). In 
summary, Black-Scholes Value of the options is: 
BS队iq = I颂‘火）beforerepricing � 
[^-SC^oj^o) after repricing 
As described in the model setup section, the compensation package contained n 
shares of executive options. With the Black-Scholes neutral repricing, the re-issued 
shares of lowered-strike-price options n ‘ should be: 
7 Other variables in the Black-Scholes Model are not shown as which are assumed to be unchanged. 
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• nxBS{S.,K) n = — - (6) 
Where BS(S。，K) is less than BS(So,So) as So<K, so n' is less than n, fewer higher 
cost options are re-issued in exchange for more lower cost options. 
Based on the Certainty Equivalent Approach used to solve the valuation and 
incentive problems in the above section, we could numerically solve the value and 
incentive effects after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing event. Figure.3 compared 
how the incentive effects varies with the original options are reset at different stock 
price level, with that of the original executive options before the repricing event. 
The solid curve in Figure.3, showed the total value incentive benefit of the 5000 
shares of executive compensation if no repricing occurred, has the same shape as the 
solid curve in Figure.2, which is the per share incentive benefit as a function of 
different current stock prices. The dashed line in Figure.3 showed the incentive 
benefits to the executive when the executive options are Black-Scholes neutrally 
repriced at the corresponding stock prices below the original strike price ($100), the 
part of the dashed curve above the original strike price combined with the solid curve 
as no repricing occurred assumed when the stock price increases. 
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Focus on the interval of stock price below $100, the solid curve is the incentive 
benefits before the Black-Scholes neutral repricing, while the dashed curve presents 
the incentive benefit after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. As we can observe, 
that the dashed curve lies strictly above the solid curve. It means that the incentive 
effects of the compensation options will increase after the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing, based on the parameters specified. Numerically, for example, if the current 
stock declines to $75 and the Black-Scholes neutral repricing is occurred, the 
executives will be given 4，179 shares of options with strike price equals to $75, 
whose Black-Scholes value is $41.77 per share; cancelled the original 5,000 shares 
of options with strike price equals to $100, whose Black-Scholes value is 34.91 per 
share. The total incentive benefits^ increased from $1,279.3 to $2034.4, or 59.02% 
increase, after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. Figure.4 illustrated the percentage 
increase of the incentive benefits after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing.^ And 
Figure.5 showed the total value amount increase of the incentive benefits after the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing at different stock price levels, i.e., the amount of the 
dashed curve in Figure.3 minus the solid curve in Figure.3. And Table.2 summarized 
the total value amount increase and the percentage increase after the Black-Scholes 
8 Incentive Benefits per share times the total shares of executive options. 
9 The percentage increase in incentive benefits is not monotonic. Only a part of the whole picture is 
showed due the large scale (10^ level) of the percentage increase around the stock price 20 to 30 make 
the rest part of diagram a single line. And both the incentive benefits before and after repricing is 
almost zero when the stock price is near zero. 
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neutral repricing at the stock price levels between $20 and $100. 
This result gives the important insight that given certain assumptions and conditions, 
the Black-Scholes neutral repricing is a pareto optimal practice, where both the 
executive and the shareholders will benefit at nobody's cost. Keeping the same 
compensation cost, the executives now have greater desire and incentive to increase 
the stock price than before the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. The incentive of the 
executives is realigned with the interest of the shareholders. 
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Chapter 6 Parameters Sensitivity 
By varying the parameters of the different factors who affecting the Certainty 
Equivalent valuation and incentives measurement, we could test the robustness of the 
effect of the Black-Scholes neutral repricing to the changes in those factors 
respectively, holding other factors unchanged. The influential factors include the 
composition of the compensation package, the outside wealth of the executive, the 
systematic risk of the company, i.e., beta, the total volatility of the company stock 
price, and the coefficient of the constant relative risk aversion of the executive. 
6.1 Compensation Package Composition 
Company stock compensation provides a higher per share incentive benefits to the 
executive than the option compensation, as the stock compensation will increase by 
$1 per share as the company stock going up by $1, while the options compensation 
will only increase by a discount of $1 at the limit case. However, as the stock 
compensation costs much more than the options compensation, the total options 
shares issued to the executive is larger than that of the stock compensation, so the 
total incentive benefits depend on the product of the per share incentive benefit and 
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the total number of shares issue. And the cash component is assumed to have no 
incentive benefit, as the derivative of cash with respect to the stock price is zero, i.e., 
the cash component will not change according to the level of stock prices. 
In the case specified in the base case, the compensation package, which is granted at 
the time when company stock price is $100, comprised of 5,000 shares of the 
company stock, 5,000 shares of call options on the company stock with strike price 
to $100, and cash component of $100,000. The Black-Scholes value of the company 
stock when at the money is $55.69, so the total compensation cost to the company is 
the summation of all the costs of each compensation component, which is $878,450. 
Holding the total cost of the compensation and the cash component unchanged, given 
the stock and option price, we could determine the possible combinations of stock 
and executive option components of the compensation package. Table.3 showed 
several different combination of compensation components used in later calculations. 
Apply the same algorithm as we calculated the Certainty Equivalent value and the 
incentive benefits measurement in the previous section, we get the results of the 
different combinations of compensation components. 
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Case 1: When the number of shares of the executive options is 1000 
The incentive benefits of the compensation options to the executive before and after 
the Black-Scholes neutral repricing is showed in Figure.6，while the value amount 
increase and the percentage increase of the incentive benefits are showed in Figure.7 
and Panel A ofFigure.8, respectively. 
Case 2: When the number of shares of the executive options is 10000 
The incentive benefits of the compensation options to the executive before and after 
the Black-Scholes neutral repricing is showed in Figure.6, while the value amount 
increase and the percentage increase of the incentive benefits are showed in Figure.7 
and Panel B of Figure. 8，respectively. 
Changing the number of shares of the executive options issued to the executive from 
5000 to 1000 and to 10000 results similar incentive effects as I have found earlier. 
The incentive curves showed similar shapes, varied only on the level of the value of 
the incentive benefits, which is explained by the level of total number of shares of 
executive options granted to the manager at the initial time. And by comparing these 
three cases, the largest increase in incentive benefit after the repricing occurred when 
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the stock price declines to the level around $50. The incentive benefits will increase 
after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing, irrespective of how the compensation 
package is comprised, holding total cost of the compensation constant. 
6.2 Outside Wealth 
The level of the outside wealth of the executive will affect her perception of the 
compensation package, and will influence the value she put on the executive options 
through the function of her utility. 
Assume that the outside wealth is positively correlated with the executive's total 
employment period. This is intuitive and reasonable, as elder executive has been 
employed for a longer time, a larger outside wealth should be accumulated, while a 
younger executive would accumulate less wealth. 
Let's consider two cases where the outside wealth is taken into consideration. One 
elder executive, who may have been a CEO for a long period of time, accumulated 
wealth of $20,000,000, and the other executive is a young CEO, who may be starting 
a new enterprise, and has outside wealth of $1,000,000. Keeping other variables 
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unchanged in the original case. We could develop the Certainty Equivalent value 
then the incentive benefits effects if the Black-Scholes neutral repricing occurred for 
these two executives. 
Case 1: when outside wealth is $1,000,000 
The incentive benefits of the compensation options to the executive before and after 
the Black-Scholes neutral repricing is showed in Figure.9, while the value amount 
increase and the percentage increase of the incentive benefits are showed in 
Figure. 10 and Panel A of Figure. 11，respectively. 
Consider that if the current stock declines to $75 and the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing is occurred, the executives will be given 4,179 shares of options with strike 
price equals to $75, whose Black-Scholes value is $41.77 per share; cancelled the 
original 5,000 shares of options with strike price equals to $100, whose 
Black-Scholes value is $34.91 per share. This is the same as the original case because 
the characteristics of the executive will not affect the fact of the repricing practice. 
The total incentive benefits increased from $1,173.8 to $1934.4, an increase of 
$760.6 or 64.79%, after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. Compared with the 
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59.02% increase in incentive benefits in the original case, we could find that the less 
the outside wealth, the more incentive restored after the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing. 
Case 2: when outside wealth is $20,000,000 
The incentive benefits of the compensation options to the executive before and after 
the Black-Scholes neutral repricing is showed in Figure.9, while the value amount 
increase and the percentage increase of the incentive benefits are showed in 
Figure. 10 and Panel B of Figure. 11，respectively. 
Again, consider the point when the current stock declines to $75 and the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing is occurred, the executive will be given 4,179 shares 
of options with strike price equals to $75, whose Black-Scholes value is $41.77 per 
share; cancelled the original 5,000 shares of options with strike price equals to $100， 
whose Black-Scholes value is $34.91 per share, as the same as else executives. The 
total incentive benefits increased from $1,310.3 to $2,063.8, an increase of $753.58 
or 57.51%, after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. Compared with the 59.02% 
increase in incentive benefits in the original case, we find that the more the outside 
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wealth, the less incentive restored after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. 
The executive has more outside wealth, will be less concern about the options 
component of the compensation package, so that the Certainty Equivalent value to 
higher wealth executives takes less discount of the Black-Scholes Value of the 
options. But basically the wealth effect does not affect the direction of the incentive 
benefits changes after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing, the incentive benefits will 
increase and the level of percentage increase is negatively correlated with executive's 
outside wealth. 
6.3 Beta 
Beta is the measure of systematic risk of a company. High beta firm is supposed to 
have higher correlation with the market portfolio while low beta firm is supposed to 
move against the market trend. In this model setup, as we assumed CAPM, the 
expected return of the distribution of the future stock price of the company is 
determined by the beta of the firm. What will be the effects of the level of correlation 
between the firm and the market on the valuation of the compensation options to the 
executive? Let's consider two cases other than the base case where beta is set equal 
to 1. 
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Case 1 ： when beta is high 
Consider the case when the company concerned has beta of 2. The incentive benefits 
of the compensation options to the executive before and after the Black-Scholes 
neutral repricing is showed in Figure. 12, while the value amount increase and the 
percentage increase of the incentive benefits are showed in Figure. 13 and Panel A of 
Figure. 14, respectively. 
Consider that if the current stock declines to $75 and the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing is occurred, the executives will be given 4,179 shares of options with strike 
price equals to $75, whose Black-Scholes value is $41.77 per share; cancelled the 
original 5,000 shares of options with strike price equals to $100，whose 
Black-Scholes value is $34.91 per share. As we keep the total volatility constant with 
different betas, and the Black-Scholes valuation assumes risk-neutral so the beta is 
not used in the valuation process but the risk-free rate, so the Black-Scholes values 
are not changed and the Black-Scholes repricing process is the same. The total 
incentive benefits increased from $1,654.8 to $2,347.9, an increase of $693.12 or 
41.89%, after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. 
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Case 2: when the beta is low 
Consider the case when the company concerned has beta of 0.5. The incentive 
benefits of the compensation options to the executive before and after the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing is showed in Figure. 12, while the value amount 
increase and the percentage increase of the incentive benefits are showed in 
Figure. 13 and Panel B of Figure. 14, respectively. 
Consider that if the current stock declines to $75 and the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing is occurred, the executives will be given 4,179 shares of options with strike 
price equals to $75，whose Black-Scholes value is $41.77 per share; cancelled the 
original 5,000 shares of options with strike price equals to $100, whose 
Black-Scholes value is $34.91 per share. As mentioned above, the Black-Scholes 
repricing process is the same. The total incentive benefits increased from $1,111.6 to 
$1,879.0, an increase of $767.43 or 69.04%, after the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing. 
Compared with the base case, where the total incentive benefits increased from 
$1,279.3 to $2034.4, a 59.02% increase. When the beta is higher, the level of the 
incentive benefits is higher than the base case in both before and after the 
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Black-Scholes neutral repricing, but the magnitude of the increase is lower than the 
base. While the opposite happened with the case where the beta is lower than the 
base case. This is intuitive because the difference in the beta results in difference in 
the expected return of the future stock price, higher expected return with higher beta, 
so the level of incentive is higher, and the similar amount increase will result in a less 
increase in the percentage change. The effect of the Black-Scholes neutral repricing 
is significant in both cases. 
6.4 Total volatility of the Company Stock Price 
The total volatility of the company stock price is a measure of the business risk of the 
company. It reflects the risk of the projects taken by the company. Company has 
more risky projects will results in higher volatility of the stock price. In the incentive 
benefits model, the volatility affected both the Black-Scholes and Certainty 
Equivalent Valuation model. Volatility is a direct input of the Black-Scholes model, 
while it entered the Certainty Equivalent model as an input affecting the distribution 
of the future stock price. In contrast to the base case where the volatility is assumed 
30%, let's consider the cases where the volatility is 50% and 10% respectively. 
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Case 1 ： when total volatility is high 
Consider the case when the company concerned has total volatility of 50%. The 
incentive benefits of the compensation options to the executive before and after the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing is showed in Figure. 15, while the value amount 
increase and the percentage increase of the incentive benefits are showed in 
Figure. 16 and Panel A of Figure. 17, respectively. 
Consider that if the current stock declines to $75 and the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing is occurred, the executives will be given 4,595 shares of options with strike 
price equals to $75, whose Black-Scholes value is $51.91 per share; cancelled the 
original 5,000 shares of options with strike price equals to $100, whose 
Black-Scholes value is $47.70 per share. As the total volatility is higher, the 
Black-Scholes value is higher than the base case whenever before or after the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing. And more lower strike price options will be 
re-issued. The total incentive benefits increased from $1,879.7 to $2,377.5, an 
increase of $497.76 or 26.48%, after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. We noticed 
that Figure.25 showed that the most significant increase in the amount of incentive 
benefits occurred around the amount of $30，different than $50 in the base case. And 
the percentage increment is only 26.48% compared with 59.02% in the base case. 
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This may be due to the higher value the executive perceived before the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing. When the volatility is high as 50% the incentive 
benefits before the Black-Scholes neutral repricing is $1,879.7 much higher than 
$1,279.3 in the base case. So the practice of the repricing is with little value when the 
decline in stock price is small, because the higher volatility makes the probability of 
the executive options being in the money again higher. 
Case 2: when total volatility is low 
Consider the case when the company concerned has total volatility of 10%. The 
incentive benefits of the compensation options to the executive before and after the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing is showed in Figure. 15, while the value amount 
increase and the percentage increase of the incentive benefits are showed in 
Figure. 16 and Panel B of Figure. 17, respectively. 
Consider that if the current stock declines to $75 and the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing is occurred, the executives will be given 3,208 shares of options with strike 
price equals to $75, whose Black-Scholes value is $34.02 per share; cancelled the 
original 5,000 shares of options with strike price equals to $100, whose 
Black-Scholes value is $21.84 per share. As the total volatility is lower, the 
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Black-Scholes value is lower than the base case whenever before or after the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing. And less lower strike price options will be re-issued 
as the after repricing Black Scholes price is much more than after repricing 
Black-Scholes price. The total incentive benefits increased from $202.26 to $1,823.5, 
an increase of $1,621.2 or 801.53%, after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. We 
noticed that Figure.28 showed that the most significant increase in the amount of 
incentive benefits occurred around the amount of $80，different than $50 in the base 
case and higher than the $30 in the case 1 where total volatility is high. And the 
percentage increment is much larger than the 59.02% increase in the base case. This 
may be due to the relatively lower value the executive perceived before the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing. When the volatility is very low, the probability that 
the executive options being in the money is very low. So the effect of the 
Black-Scholes neutral repricing on the restoration of the incentive is quite significant 
even the decline in stock price is small. 
We could summarize from these two cases, that the incentive realignment 
effectiveness is significantly correlated with the degree of the decline of the stock 
price relative to the total volatility of the stock price. 
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6.5 The coefficient of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion of the Executive 
I have assumed that the executive has constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) p in the 
Certainty Equivalent model, the utility function is shown in equation (1) 
‘In(炉） p = 1 
We have considered the base case where the executive has constant relative risk 
aversion of 1, let's consider the effectiveness of the same repricing scheme on the 
executives with different risk aversion. 
Case 1: The Executive is More Risk Averse 
When the executive is more risk averse, she will require higher expected return for a 
given risk. Consider the case where rho is 3. The incentive benefits of the 
compensation options to the executive before and after the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing is showed in Figure. 18, while the value amount increase and the percentage 
increase of the incentive benefits are showed in Figure. 19 and Panel A of Figure.20, 
respectively. These three figures are basically the same as the base case when 
Constant Relative Risk Aversion is 1. 
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Consider that if the current stock declines to $75 and the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing is occurred, the executives will be given 4,179 shares of options with strike 
price equals to $75, whose Black-Scholes value is $41.77 per share; cancelled the 
original 5,000 shares of options with strike price equals to $100, whose 
Black-Scholes value is $34.91 per share. This is the same as the original case because 
the characteristics of the executive will not affect the fact of the repricing practice. 
The total incentive benefits increased from $1,198.8 to $1956.3, an increase of 
$757.48 or 63.19%, after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. This is a little higher 
than the level of percentage increase in the base case, where the value is 59.02%. As 
the executive is more risk averse, the Black-Schole neutral repricing is more 
effective. 
Case 2: when Executive is Less Risk Averse 
Less risk averse executive will require less expected return for a given level of risk. 
Consider the case where rho is 0.5. The incentive benefits of the compensation 
options to the executive before and after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing is 
showed in Figure. 18, while the value amount increase and the percentage increase of 
the incentive benefits are showed in Figure. 19 and Panel B of Figure.20, respectively. 
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These three figures are basically the same as the base case when Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion is 1 as well. 
Consider that if the current stock declines to $75 and the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing is occurred, the executives will be given 4,179 shares of options with strike 
price equals to $75, whose Black-Scholes value is $41.77 per share; cancelled the 
original 5,000 shares of options with strike price equals to $100，whose 
Black-Scholes value is $34.91 per share. This is the same as the original case because 
the characteristics of the executive will not affect the fact of the repricing practice. 
The total incentive benefits increased from $1,300.4 to $2054.6, an increase of 
$754.14 or 57.99%, after the Black-Scholes neutral repricing. This is a little lower 
than the level of percentage increase in the base case, where the value is 59.02%. As 
the executive is less risk averse, the Black-Schole neutral repricing is less effective. 
In general, the effectiveness of the Black-Scholes neutral repricing is significant 
within the interval of 0 to 3 of the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
Based on the numerical analysis of the optimization problem and the sensitivity test, 
it is shown that the result of the increase in incentive effects for the executive after 
the Black-Scholes Neutral Repricing is irrespective of the particular parameters 
selected. Figure 21 through figure 25 showed the incentive effects before and after 
the Black-Scholes Neutral Repricing with changing number of options issued, 
outside wealth, systematic risk, total volatility and coefficient of Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion respectively, at the level when the stock price declined from $100 to 
$75. The increase in incentive effect is significant. 
Since options have become a significant component of compensation relied on by 
corporations, particularly in the technology sector, to incentivize employees, 
repricing of underwater options has become a common consideration. In most 
circumstances, stock option repricing is difficult to justify. Repricing may be 
warranted if necessary to retain the services of employees critical to the organization, 
but even in such a case, repricing is probably best undertaken on a limited basis and 
perhaps even on a less than even exchange basis, such as the Black-Scholes neutral 
repricing. 
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The Black-Scholes neutral repricing is a pareto optimal practice, given certain 
conditions and assumptions. Both the executive and the shareholders will be better 
off, and the executive will have stronger incentive to increase the company stock 
price, without extra cost incurred to the shareholders. If there is not lack of corporate 
governance in the company, the incentive could be realigned after the stock prices 
experienced sharp decline. Otherwise, the repricing could be a mechanism for the 
executive to lock in profit from inside information, if the repricing is timed before a 
good news announcement or after a bad news. 
Finally, this framework is heavily dependent on the specific utility function, which is 
crucial to apply the numerical analysis technique, and it is also essential to know the 
risk aversion and outside wealth of the executive to determine the optimal 
compensation schedule to achieve the desired incentive effects. But there is 
asymmetric information about the wealth or utility of the executive between agent 
and principal, the further exploration of the results in a principal agent framework is 
an interesting issue of further study. 
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Appendix: Matlab Programs 
% Find the CE value make the expected utilities equal 
function CE = ce(V,SO,X,beta,r,WO，C,ns’no,t) 
expect一 return = r + beta*0.065; 
retum_vol=0.3; 
% Simulate the lognormal distribution of stock price 
% and calculate the corresponding probability 






actual_retum = log(St./SO); 
rb—St=St+change; 
rb = log(rb_St./SO); 
pr_lhs = normcdf(actual 一return, expect—return, return—vol); 
pr一 right一bound = normcdf(rb，expect—return,return一vol); 
pr = pr_right—bound - pr—Ihs; 
% Payoff of stock option 
OP = max(St-X,0); 
% Ending Wealth 
Wt = (WO+C).*exp(r.*t) + St.*ns + OP.*no; 
% Ending Utility 
% Simplification of utility as log utility 
Ut = log(Wt); 
% Expected Edning Utility 
EUt =sum(Ut.*pr); 
% CE approach 
% V CE value of the options compensation 
WtV = (WO+C+V).*exp(r.*t) + St.*ns; 
% Utility of CE compensation 
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UtV = log(WtV); 
EUtV = sum(UtV.*pr); 
% find the value of CE to make expected utilities equal 
c = EUtV - EUt; 
%Calculate the CE value of the Options Compensation 
function [c]=fCE(SO，X,beta，r，WO,C，ns，no，t) 
%Searching initiatives 
a = 0; 
b = 10000000; 
delta = 0.01; 
% Call function bisect to calculate CE 
[c，yc，er，P] = bisect('ce',a,b,delta,SO,X,beta,r,WO,C,ns,no,t); 
% Searching algorithm for CE value to make expected utilities equal 
function [c，yc，er，P] = bisect(f，a，b,delta，SO，X，beta，r，WO，C,ns,no，t) % 
%BISECT The bisection method i 
% Inputs 
% f name of the function 
% a left endpoint 
% b right endpoint 
% delta convergence tolerance 
% Return 
% c solution: the root 
% yc solution: the function value 
% err error estimate in c 
% P History vector of the iterations % 
P = [ab]; 
ya = feval(f,a，SO，X，beta，r，WO，C，ns，no，t); 
yb = feval(f，b,SO，X,beta，r，WO，C，ns，no,t); 
if ya*yb > 0，break, end 
maxl = 1 +round((log(b-a)-log(delta))/log(2)); 
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for k=l:maxl, 
c = (a+b)/2; 
yc = feval(f，c，SO，X,beta，r，WO，C，ns，no，t); 
if yc == 0, 
a = c; 
b = c; 
elseif yb*yc > 0， 
b = c; 
yb = yc; 
else 
a = c; 
ya = yc; 
end 
P = [P;ab]; 
if b-a < delta, break, end 
end 
c = (a+b)/2; 
yc = feval(f,c，SO，X，beta，r，WO，C,ns，no，t); 
err = abs(b-a)/2; 
clc 
clear 
% Resetting strike price if repricing occurred 
S0=[l:l:200]; 
















% c=CE Value w/o BS neutral repricing 
for i=l: 1:200 
c(i)=fCE(S0(i)，100，beta，r，W0，C,ns，5000，t); 
inc=diff(c)./diff(SO); %calculate incentive to increase stock price 
end 
% Calculate No. of shares re-issued under BS repricing 
for k=l: 1:200 
[bscallO(k), bsput(k)]= blsprice(SO(k),l00,r,t,0.3,0); 
[bscallt(k), bsput(k)]= blsprice(SO(k),X(k),r,t,0.3,0); 
no(k)=5000*bscall0(k)/bscallt(k); 
end 





bsnrcevps(i) = bsnrc(i)./no(i); 
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Figure 1 
Black-Scholes Value and Certainty Equivalent Value，when Strike Price is $100 
Certainty Equivalent value is a large discount of the Black-Scholes value of the executive 
compensation options. And the CE value is almost equal to zero when the executive 
compensation options are deeply out of the money. 
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Incentive Effect, when Strike Price is $100 
The Black-Scholes incentive is the delta of the Black-Scholes value, which accounts for the 
cost of the company who granted the executive compensation options, is therefore not 
appropriate to measure the incentive of the managers to increase the stock price. While the 
Certainty Equivalent incentive is the increment of the value to the executive when stock 
price increases, it would be a better and more suitable measurement of the incentive to 
increase stock price. The figure reports that the per share CE incentive is convergent to a 
lower level than the BS delta when the options are deeply in the money. 
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Figure 3 
Incentive Benefit Before and After the Black-Scholes neutral Repricing 
The figure reports, for the base case, the incentive effects after BS repricing is lying strictly 
higher than those before BS repricing, whatever the level of the stock price when the 
repricing occurred. Both parties will be better off at no one's cost. 
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Figure 4 
Percentage Increment of Incentive Benefits after BS Repricing 
The percentage increment after the BS repricing is significant when the executive options are 
out of the money. The huge percentage increment is magnified by the small denominator 
when the option is deeply out of money is due to the fact that the previous unrepriced almost 
have no incentive effect. 
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Figure 5 
Amount Increment of Incentive Benefits after BS Repricing 
The amount increment of incentive benefits is the difference between the CE incentives after 
and before the BS repricing. It is all positive over the range that the repricing could happen. 
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Figure 18 
Comparison of Incentive Benefits with Different Degree of Risk A v e r s i o n 
Figure reports the incentives benefits before and after Black-Scholes repricing with the 
number of shares of the executives compensation options granted changed from 5000 in the 
base case to 10000 and 1000. The results of increase in the incentive to increase the stock 
price agreed with the base case. The difference in the magnitude of the incentive is due to the 
number of options granted. 
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Figure 7 
Comparison of Total Incentive Increment after BS Repricing with Different 
Compensation Package 
The total incentive increments after Black-Scholes repricing are different and proportional to 
the number of shares of executive compensation options in the different compensation 
package, holding the total compensation cost constant. 
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Figure 8 
Incentive Benefit Percentage Increment after BS Repricing with Different 
Compensation Package 
The percentage increment of the incentive benefits when 1000 shares of options are granted 
is shown in panel a, and panel b showed the case when 10000 shares of options are granted. 
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Comparison of Incentive Benefits with Different Degree of Risk Aversion 
Figure reports the incentives benefits before and after Black-Scholes repricing with the 
initial outside wealth of the executive changed from 5 million in the base case to 20 million 
and 1 million. The results of increase in the incentive to increase the stock price agreed with 
the base case. The difference in the magnitude of the incentive is not significant with respect 
to different level of outside wealth. 
Incentive Benefits Comparison with Diffferent Outside Wealth 35001 I I I I I ~I 1 1 1 
I ——Incentive Before BS Repricing, wealth = $5M 
Incentive After BS Repricing, wealth = $5M 
— I n c e n t i v e Before BS Repricing, wealth = $20M 
3000 Incentive After BS Repricing, wealth = $20M •^^+：丨科能！！ 
.Incentive Before BS Repricing, wealth = $1M 1M 
I -.... ；. Incentive After BS Repricing, wealth = $1M 
2500 - -
j - j ^ -
I 1500 - / -‘ / 
1000 - M / / -/ 
5 � � - / / • 
/ y 
0 ^ I I 1 1 1 1 1————I -J 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 
Stock Price ($) 
69 
Figure 10 
Comparison of Total Incentive Increment after BS Repricing with Different Outside 
Wealth 
The total increment of incentive is significant for both cases. And the difference in the total 
incentive increments after Black-Scholes repricing are not significant for executives with 
different outside wealth. 
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Figure 11 
Incentive Benefit Percentage Increment after BS Repricing with Different Outside 
Wealth 
The percentage increment of the incentive benefits when the initial outside wealth of the 
executive is $ 1 million is shown in panel a, and panel b showed the case when the executive 
has 20 million. 
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Comparison of Incentive Benefits with Different Degree of Risk Aversion 
Figure reports the incentives benefits before and after Black-Scholes repricing with the beta 
changed from 1 in the base case to 2 and 0.5. The results of increase in the incentive to 
increase the stock price agreed with the base case. And the higher the systematic risk of the 
company, the higher the incentive of the executive to increase the stock price. 
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Figure 13 
Comparison of Total Incentive Increment after BS Repricing with Different 
Systematic Risk (Beta) 
When the executive options are repriced when it is deeply out of the money, the higher the 
systematic risk of the company, the larger the total increment after BS repricing in the 
incentive to increase the stock price. The results reversed when the executive options are out 
of the money but not too deeply. However, the increase in the incentive after BS repricing is 
significant. 
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Figure 14 
Incentive Benefit Percentage Increment after BS Repricing with Different Systematic 
Risk (Beta) 
The percentage increment of the incentive benefits when the beta is 2 is shown in panel a, 
and panel b showed the case when the beta is 0.5. 
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Comparison of Incentive Benefits with Different Degree of Risk Aversion 
Figure reports the incentives benefits before and after Black-Scholes repricing with the total 
volatility changed from 30% in the base case to 50% and 10%. The results of increase in the 
incentive to increase the stock price agreed with the base case. 
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Figure 16 
Comparison of Total Incentive Increment after BS Repricing with Different Total 
Volatility 
When the stock price is less volatile, a decline of stock price is relatively significant 
compared with a same decline in price for a more volatile stock. When the options go out of 
the money deeper and deeper, the higher the volatility of the stock price, the greater the total 
increment after BS repricing in the incentive to increase the stock price. It is intuitive, that 
for the more volatile stock, repricing when the stock price is nearly the strike price is not 
necessary as the stock price will be highly likely to bump up again. In both cases, the 
increase in the incentive to increase stock price after BS repricing is significant 
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Figure 17 
Incentive Benefit Percentage Increment after BS Repricing with Different Total 
Volatility 
The percentage increment of the incentive benefits when the total volatility is 50% is shown 
in panel a, and panel b showed the case when the total volatility is 10%. 
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Comparison of Incentive Benefits with Different Degree of Risk Aversion 
Figure reports the incentives benefits before and after Black-Scholes repricing with the 
degree of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) from 1 in the base case to 3 and 0.5. The 
results of increase in the incentive to increase the stock price agreed with the base case. The 
difference in the magnitude of the incentive is not significant with respect to different degree 
of risk aversion. 
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Figure 19 
Comparison of Total Incentive Increment after BS Repricing with Different Degree 
of Risk Aversion 
The total increment of incentive is significant for both cases. And the difference in the total 
incentive increments after Black-Scholes repricing is not significant for executives with 
different degree of risk aversion. 
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Figure 20 
Incentive Benefit Percentage Increment after BS Repricing with Different Degree of 
Risk Aversion 
The percentage increment of the incentive benefits when the degree of constant relative risk 
aversion is 3 is shown in panel a, and panel b showed the case when the degree of constant 
relative risk aversion is 0.5. 
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Comparison of Incentive Effects before and after BS Repricing for Different Number 
of Initial Options Granted, when Stock Price Declined from $100 to $75 
The incentive increases for all the scenarios with different number of initial options granted, 
and the increment is increasing as more options granted. 
Repricing Occurred when stock price is $75, for different number of initial options granted 
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Figure 22 
Comparison of Incentive Effects before and after BS Repricing for Different Initial 
Outside Wealth, when Stock Price Declined from $100 to $75 
The incentive increases for all the scenarios with different initial outside wealth, and the 
increment doesn't change much for the executives with different level of initial wealth. 
Repricing occurred at stock price is $75, for different initial outside wealth 2100| ==^ . . ~ I 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Before Rep门cing 
——After Repricing --...... 
2 0 0 0 - -
/ 
1900 - / -
1800 - -





o 1600 - -
•云 
c 1500 - -
1400 - -
1300 - -
. z •一 .一 1200 - Z -
/ 
i 1100^^ ‘ ‘ ‘ 1 ‘ 1 1 1 1 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 
Outside Wealth ^ 
82 
Figure 23 
Comparison of Incentive Effects before and after BS Repricing for Different 
Systematic Risk, when Stock Price Declined from $100 to $75 
The incentive increases for all the scenarios with different systematic risk of the firm, and the 
increment doesn't change much with different level of systematic risk of the firm. 
Repricing occured at Stock Price is $75, for diffeirent beta 
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Comparison of Incentive Effects before and after BS Repricing for Different Total 
Volatility, when Stock Price Declined from $100 to $75 
The incentive increases for all the scenarios with different total volatility of the stock, and 
the increment is decreasing as the stock price becomes more volatile. 
Repricing Occurred when stock price is $75, for different stock volatility 
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Comparison of Incentive Effects before and after BS Repricing for Different 
Coefficient ofCRRA, when Stock Price Declined from $100 to $75 
Panel A showed the range of the coefficient from 0 to 1，and Panel B showed the range of the 
coefficient from 1 to 5. The incentive increases for all the scenarios with different coefficient, 
and the incentive is decreasing when the executives become more risk averse, but the 
increment is similar after the BS repricing. 
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Black-Scholes Value and CE Value of the Compensation Options 
Black-Scholes Value and Certainty Equivalent Value of the executive compensation options 
are contrasted at different stock price values, where the strike price of the option is $100. The 
CE value takes a large discount of the BS value at all the various levels of stock prices, and 
executives percept that the executive options are nearly worthless when it is deeply out of the 
money (e.g., from the range of $5 to $35). 
Stock Price BS Value CE Value Stock Price BS Value CE Value 
$5 $0.03 $0.00 $105 $60.05 $15.24 
$10 $0.30 $0.00 $110 $64.46 $17.86 
$15 $0.99 $0.00 $115 $68.91 $20.59 
$20 $2.15 $0.00 $120 $73.41 $23.42 
$25 $3.75 $0.00 $125 $77.94 $26.33 
$30 $5.75 $0.00 $130 $82.51 $29.30 
$35 $8.09 $0.00 $135 $87.11 $32.32 
$40 $10.74 $0.02 $140 $91.73 $35.37 
$45 $13.64 $0.07 $145 $96.39 $38.46 
$50 $16.77 $0.19 $150 $101.06 $41.56 
$55 $20.10 $0.42 $155 $105.76 $44.68 
$60 $23.60 $0.82 $160 $110.48 $47.82 
$65 $27.24 $1.43 $165 $115.21 $50.96 
$70 $31.02 $2.28 $170 $119.97 $54.12 
$75 $34.91 $3.40 $175 $124.74 $57.27 
$80 $38.91 $4.78 $180 $129.52 $60.43 
$85 $42.99 $6.43 $185 $134.31 $63.59 
$90 $47.16 $8.33 $190 $139.12 $66.76 
$95 $51.39 $10.45 $195 $143.94 $69.92 
$100 $55.69 $12.76 $200 $148.77 $73.09 
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Table II 
Amount and Percentage Increase of Incentive Benefits 
The incentive benefits of the Black-Scholes neutral repricing are reported as the amount 
increment and percentage increase. The amount increment is calculated as the difference 
between the incentive benefits after and before the Black-Scholes repricing, and the 
percentage increase is calculated as dividing the amount increment by the incentive benefits 
before the Black-Scholes repricing. The table shows the incentive benefits of the repricing 
for the base case. 
Stock Price Amount Increment Percentage Increase 
$20 $477.48 5126900.00% 
$25 $665.32 357190.00% 
$30 $846.71 48359.04% 
$35 $1,012.93 10952.97% 
$40 $1,152.59 3561.38% 
$45 $1,251.54 1476.09% 
$50 $1,297.09 722.64% 
$55 $1,282.51 396.09% 
$60 $1,209.44 234.05% 
$65 $1,087.37 145.05% 
$70 $930.62 92.24% 
$75 $755.11 59.02% 
$80 $575.47 37.20% 
$85 $403.55 22.41% 
$90 $247.55 12.18% 
$95 $112.36 5.02% 
$100 ^ 0.00% 
87 
Table III 
Possible Combination of Compensation Package 
Holding the total cost of the compensation package constant, various combinations of 
options, stock, and cash component could be determined. The table reported the 
combinations that are used in the parameter sensitivity test of the compensation component 
in Chapter 6. 
Stock 
Options (shares) (shares)'" Cash ($) Total Cost ($) 
7228 100000 878450 
5000 5000 100000 878450 
10000 2216 100000 878450 
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